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Pluralism in Post-Communist Law 
 
 
Abstract. This paper discusses problems related to the incorporation of constitutional rule of 
law into a pluralistic legal system, primarily in post-communist Hungary. Normative pluralism 
was characteristic of state socialism. Is this pluralism going to shape the emerging  constitution-
driven law of post-communism? The paper concludes that although constitutional universalism 
brought a new dimension to law and in principle has helped to promote the centrality of law 
in the competitive world of normative orderings, it may in the long run remain an elitist tool, 
fundamentally ignored or circumvented by sub-legal forms of social interaction. 
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Although post-communist societies increasingly differ from each other, the case 
of Hungary is sufficient to highlight a normative problem of legal pluralism, 
which could be best described as the problem of insufficient centrality of formal 
law in post-communist normative orders.1 “Universal” constitutionalism with its 
specific value system is best understood as a significant attempt to secure a 
prime position for state law. This paper points to certain immanent and social 
variables which limit the chances of success for creating constitutional control 
over law and society. 
 Part 1 of the paper discusses certain methodological problems of normative 
pluralism and the place of constitution-driven law within it. Part 2 deals with 
legal pluralism under state socialism. Part 3 reviews the role of universal 
constitutionalism in shaping a normative order of government with a new 
legitimacy after the collapse of socialism and its social limits. Part 4 is an 
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 Although they all started with a rather rudimentary legal-administrative normative 
system inherited from the Soviet regime, their social, cultural, economic, and other 
differences (as well as history and geography) make the post Soviet Empire countries 
different. The applicability of the Hungarian experience is certainly greater in Poland than in 
Russia, not to speak of Albania or Tadjikistan. Nevertheless, given the global importance of 
Russia, in certain contexts I will refer to Russia, at least to show how different the problem of 
pluralism can be in various countries. 
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relevance of the constitutional legal system to the competition of normative 
orders. The paper concludes that although constitutional universalism brought a 
new dimension to law and in principle has helped to promote the centrality of 
law in the competitive world of normative orderings, it may in the long run 
remain an elite tool, fundamentally ignored or circumvented by sub-legal forms 
of social interaction. 
 
 
1. Pluralism and Post-communist law  
 
Given the multiplicity of meanings attributed to legal pluralism it is important 
to clarify the implications of the term as applied to post-communist law. Certain 
connotations of the term were developed in reference to different socio-legal 
realities, which do not apply in Eastern Europe. (In other words, I find legal 
pluralism to be a strictly contextual phenomenon.) Roderick A. Macdonald’s 
summary of the pluralist approach claims that the relations of the various 
elements are relative and hence they differ from one social setting to another:  
 “The legal pluralist acknowledges and seeks out certain elements of inter-
normative relationships. The implicit is more important than the explicit. [...] 
The inter-relationship of normative regimes can never be a relationship of 
hierarchy, close-integration and vertical discipline. The legal pluralist imagines 
a process of mutual construction of a normative regime[...]. There can be no 
exogenous standards of fairness, justness and conformity that are not first 
filtered through the plural normative understandings of the regimes constructed 
and deployed by interacting parties.”2 
 I am not denying that there are certain social circumstances where there can 
never be a relationship of hierarchy among the normative regimes. However, 
it seems to me that the model that best describes Eastern Europe at the 
moment is one where “official law” does play a central role and competing 
partial normative regimes are always determined in their relationship (e.g. 
parasitism, manipulation, distortion, etc.) to official state law. As Karl Marx 
argued in a different context there is always a specific dominant form of 
production, which determines the place of other coexisting forms of production. 





 Macdonald, R. A.: Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal 
Pluralism. Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 15 (1998): 69, 89–90. 
Macdonald here refers to Webber, J.: Rapports de force, rapports de justice: La genese 
d’une communauté normative entre colonisateurs at colonises. In: Le Droit soluble: 
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modernist claims, it is state law (with all its internal pluralism) that directly and 
indirectly determines the place of other unofficial legal systems, and to a lesser 
extent that of other normative systems.  
 Modern law was reintroduced in Hungary under the guidance of “universal 
constitutionalism”. This resulted in considerable inefficiencies. The normative 
structure and supervisory capacity of constitutionalized state law is not a 
guarantee for setting a social agenda, nor for the actual steering of social life, 
and its institutions (family, race relations) or other spheres of life (e.g. business).  
 The tensions that exist among the elements of the pluralistic legal system 
are partly related to the post-modern nature of state law. “If, as a conception of 
social organization, modernism was primarily about rationalism, universalism, 
certainty and order, post-modernism seems to be about empiricism, parti-
cularism, indeterminacy and disorder”.3 Obviously, these post-modern features 
of indeterminacy might allow the existence of competing normative systems. 
The particularity of post-communist law is that it was imposed as if it could 
actually provide the values and efficiency of modern law. The indeterminacy 
that was already built into the law of Western countries, which served as the 
model in the legal transposition, was not acknowledged in the East. It is no 
wonder that post-communist state law appears to have been unable to reflect 
the basic characteristics assumed to be the cornerstones of modernity (as listed 
above). In the early years of the democratic transition there was a strong 
emphasis on the universal dimension of the constitution, human rights, and the 
rule of law as a par excellence project of enlightenment. In reality, the law 
that was transposed from the “West” and then transformed and formulated 
increasingly at the local level was indeterminate and porous, enabling more 
and more local plural normative subsystems to resurface, continue to exist or 
be created. Transferred “modern” law contributed to the malfunctioning of the 
social system, to the undermining of the legitimacy of the rule of law, and to 
diminishing the interest in and enthusiasm for the effort to enforce the new 
legal system. The indeterminacy of post-modern law in post-communism 
enabled the operation of normative regimes that are predominantly dependent 
on or related to the official law. This plurality (under the guidance of the 
official law) enabled the local domination of criminal or corrupt individuals, 
without providing to social relations some kind non-alienation or intimacy. 
Some post-modernists claim that post-modern plural polymorph law can 
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 Ironically, the spontaneous orders of post-modernism were also promised by 
Hayek’s minimalist rule of law. 
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that emerged in the distorted and parallel legal systems is hierarchical in 
nature or at least enables temporary dominance. One of the major short-
comings of both the official law and the competing normative systems is that 
at the moment neither is able to offer long term fixed relations. 
 The more we move away in time from the collapse of state-socialism in the 
Soviet Empire the less appropriate it is to use the term “post-communist” with 
regard to the respective new legal systems to have emerged. The legal systems 
are increasingly departing from their common Soviet origins. From the socio-
legal perspective, which looks at law within the social system, the emerging 
legal systems are increasingly differentiated. Despite developing out of it, 
the post-communist legal system is not determined by the Soviet legal system. 
Even to a lesser extent was the Soviet political system and Soviet social model 
responsible for determining the future of the many societies formed on the 
former territory of the Empire. This is partly because despite the unifying 
umbrella of state socialism these societies were always rather different from one 
another. 
 Nevertheless, there is still a good enough reason to discuss the problem of 
pluralism in the East Central European legal systems, notwithstanding that they 
have increasingly less in common (except for the insufficiency of human re-
sources and a sufficient social aptitude to follow closely the Western legal 
model that these countries imposed on themselves in the transition). This reason 
is clearly a normative one and is based on the following: Modern law—due to its 
formal qualities—represents (at least in principle and at varying social costs) 
a number of social and normative values such as predictability, security, im-
partiality, equality, and perhaps even a sense of justice. It also contributes to the 
establishment and functioning of the market. Modern law has a function of 
creating social order and—again, at a considerable social cost—it offers a kind 
of social peace. The centerpiece of a modern legal system founded on the rule of 
law is the constitution. Modern constitutions are not only tools for achieving 
social cohesion within a state governed by law but also offer a blueprint to circum-
venting governmental abuse of power. Further, they may satisfy the Kelsenian 
need for positivism by providing a solid hierarchy of norms and they offer a 
mechanism to implement the hierarchy through constitutional adjudication. 
 Only pompous lawyers—but no sociologist of law—could be naive or 
corrupt or perhaps blind enough to overlook the fact that restraints imposed by 
modern law on governmental oppression are at best limited. Certain forms of 
social domination are perhaps more civilized because of certain legal forms. 
These legal forms help to disguise milder cases of dominance or structural 
oppression by the state or other social agencies, institutions, groups, and 
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structures. Still, the rule of law may have a socially beneficial effect in 
transitional societies if it successfully penetrates into and permeates all 
normative structures in society, or at least if it becomes an efficient model 
for all normative systems developed around state law. It is important to have 
a normative system that at least has the ambition to envelope all of society 
and which at least promises to provide—and in certain regards actually 
provides—particular solutions to social conflicts and aspirations that are not 
arbitrary in nature. To the extent that this system can effectively limit the power 
of government, it will indicate or signal that power can be limited honestly and 
credibly. 
 Hence the special importance of the problem of pluralism in post-communist 
law. It is in this context that this article intends to determine the extent to which 
the values of modern law as expressed in the constitution and constitutional law 
actually exist in the law on the books and in the law in action. The paper also 
makes an attempt to show how state law permeates other normative structures 
which apply to the very same relations state law intends to govern, and I also try 
to locate the spheres which are outside of state law’s reach, and to identify their 
various competing normative structures. In other words, even if some level of 
legal pluralism is likely inevitable, the normative issue for post-communist law 
is the examination of the extent to which the law of the state (that claims to be 
the depository of universal constitutional values) can maintain a central role for 
itself. The problem of the social impact of state law is further complicated by the 
constitutional mandate and mission of government and official law. After all, for 
reasons of legitimacy, the state tends to represent itself and its actions as being 
mandated or sanctioned by the constitution.  
 The state—which is inevitably a major social player—generates a whole 
agenda for itself in the name of carrying out the goals of the constitution. As a 
result, state enacted and enforced law has a special and often central role in 
modern and post-modern societies. This is not to say that the law is monolithic 
and thus is the only normative system determining social action. State law is 
just one of the various competing normative orders. It is a relatively recent 
phenomenon that centralized state law became the dominant normative order, or 
at least that it could make such a claim. In many countries state law at the level 
of legal theory and constitutional law was held sovereign, i.e. not only supreme 
but exclusive too, from an official perspective. This supremacy was never 
complete however, as one can already see in Max Weber’s complaints about the 
particularist corporative order recreated at the advent of the 20th century.  
 Even the modern formal-rational legal system itself is subject to internal 
pluralism, as there are competing legal subsystems within it. These subsystems, 
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like for example the various branches of law in continental systems or the 
parallel enactments of competing state bodies (including branches of power and 
competing public administrations), are never fully harmonized, even though 
modern law tries to develop intellectual (substantive) and procedural means to 
resolve or at least control such conflicts. Internal pluralism refers to different 
phenomena. State law is composed of culturally different traditions and is 
generated by competing decision-making bodies, and to an extent these 
subsystems continue to resist attempts at normative and social homogenization. 
Note for example that even in England—a country that is seen by many as the 
model country for the rule of law—prisons had been beyond the reach of 
external judicial control until very recently. Today legal homogeneity attempts 
to extend judicial review to even these areas previously off-limit, but the limits 
of judicial and constitutional review in Hungary also designate the current limits 
of homogenization.  
 It is also important to understand the notion of pluralism from the social 
actor’s perspective as well. Citizens have multiple—and to some extent 
conflicting—legal statuses. This plurality is of course partly the consequence 
of the existing multiplicity of competing roles of the individual who exists in a 
complex society. The applicability of a certain set of rules depends on the 
qualification of one’s legal status. The alien (migrant) who spends six months at 
the same detention center first as an illegal entrant, then as an asylum seeker, 
then, after positive review as a non-resident alien, and finally as a resident alien 
notices enormous differences in treatment. 
 Legal pluralism is often used to refer to the relationship of normative orders. 
It is undeniable that quite often a system of norms not created or enforced by the 
state prevails over state law. There are important pockets of non-modernized 
sectors in modern societies with their own partial normative systems. It is, 
however, misleading to call all these normative systems as “legal” or “law”. In 
most of the actual cases the problem of state law is simply that it has to compete 
with many other forms of normative regulation. State law, and constitution 
driven law in particular, are often inefficient not only because of a lack of 
resources to guarantee that they can perform their declared function, but also 
because of the official value system they tend to impose on social organizations 
and institutions. On the other hand, the concepts of non-state-law tend to 
disregard the characteristics of modern law, those characteristics, which make 
formal and general law so important for modernity. In this context constitutional 
universalia are both formal (e.g. elements of the rule of law) and substantive 
(equality, rights). Constitutionalism is an attempt to structure government 
through checks and balances. From a societal perspective this means the 
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exclusion of certain means for particular social groups in their attempts to access 
state power. 
 Only some of the normative orders that compete in contemporary society 
have features which make them similar to state law. A normative system may 
compete with official law in a number of ways. Some of these competing 
systems show considerable similarity to law in their structure (e.g. in terms of 
generality, sanctions etc.) If normative systems use similar or interfering codes 
and signals, then the issue of coordination and primacy comes up. It is in this 
context that the social primacy of state law within legal pluralism becomes 
relevant. Successful competitors with official law dispose of one of the basic 
characteristics of state law, namely reliance on the use of coercion (sometimes 
including official enforcement), and the generality and abstractness of rules. 
Non-state law may rely on legitimization related to its creation. Modern state 
norms are very often democratically legitimized—i.e. they are creations—
while alternative systems have their roots in traditions and/or are supported by 
common practice. But even in non-state (unofficial) normative systems the 
beginning of the existence of the norms predate decision and action, and thus 
societal actors are aware of these norms by default. More or less systematically 
they cover entire areas of social life and they are enforced partly by the use 
of force, partly by communal sanctions. As such these competing normative 
systems challenge the constitutional order which insists on the domestic 
applicability of its universal values and arrangements.  
 To the extent that local normative systems are pre-modern or post-modern in 
their particularism, there is a potential conflict with the modernity components 
of the “universalist” constitution. Actual constitutions and constitution-generated 
systems of norms depart from the alleged “universalism” both in the East and in 
the West. Some of the most obvious examples of constitutional concessions 
which create exceptions to universal principles of constitutionalism are the 
accommodations made for religious institutions or the institutionalization of 
the concept of the state of emergency. The acceptance of special personal, 
religious or ethnic legal regimes in the constitution allows for hidden 
adjustments in the legal system. This latter development is, however, very 
controversial as it may result in the extension of constitutional control to 
uncharted spheres of social interaction and hence may lead to new conflicts 
and previously unforeseen irrelevance. 
 The concept of legal pluralism results in a paradigm change in legal 
thinking. This is directed against positivist concepts of law which are based 
on sovereignty and exclusivity. This positivism was reinforced by the “consti-
tutionalization” of law. Constitutionalization as one of the latest developments 
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of legal “universalism” means that all branches of law are destined to be subject 
to an increased level of constitutional review, and in addition their internal value 
system and even their reasoning is intended to be governed by the constitution. 
These trends allegedly increase homogeneity within law. The claim that these 
trends represent universal tendencies and even universal values adds to the 
legitimacy of the constitution and correspondingly to that of law because it 
indicates that the system meets international standards.5 
 Even if one admits the polycentricity of law one ought to take a position 
regarding the place of state law. The constitutional legal system has a dis-
tinguished place among the competing or coexisting normative systems. A 
constitutionally reinforced positive legal system has distinct roles in the shaping 
of the social order. The penetration of constitutional universalia into a legal 
system has contradictory consequences. Constitutional universalism does have a 
potential to homogenize the legal system, e.g. it extends the scope of the rights 
language and juridification. However, at the same time it causes new value 
conflicts and new institutional conflicts.  
 A universal value system may be imposed on existing subsystems of social 
action in such a way that this results in new conflicts. This might be aggravated 
by the institutional conflicts within the legal system: legal actors too have 
their own interests which might be jeopardized by universal constitutional 
imperialism. Hence the conflict between constitutional and other courts, hence 
the reluctance of ordinary judges to look at the constitution.  
 The constitutionalization of law is inherently a source of conflict both within 
and outside the legal system. At the same time it can be quite successful in 
creating rationally or judicially manageable frameworks for social and political 
conflicts. Constitutionalization may also help to increase the degree of social 
inclusion of certain marginal groups (at least at a symbolic level). But in cases 
where constitutional “resolutions”6 did cause the legal system to be more 
inclusive and thus managed to defuse social conflict, constitutional juridification 
also increased law’s social presence. Law exercises a certain mental control vis-
à-vis other normative systems, even if it does not always succeed in determining 
human behavior. Pre- and post-modern social thinking will conflict with the 
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systems. See Sajó, A.: Rights in Post-Communism. In: Western Rights? Post-Communist 
Applications (ed.: Sajó, A.). Deventer, 1996. 
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that the contribution of modern constitutions to modern law is ambiguous. 
Certain values that are part of contemporary constitutionalism in some of its 
forms—namely welfare rights—may undermine the formal qualities of modern 
law to the extent that they enable material justice and (often quite arbitrary) state 
intervention in spheres of private life. 
 What is the result of the attempts of competing normative systems to 
minimize the influence of modern law? Do they result in the perpetuation of pre-
modern structures or in a perpetual disorder of mutually exclusive competitive 
orders? Even where community-made or tribal normative systems prevail, or 
where state law is not implemented for one reason or another, new normative 
structures emerge and begin to function without necessarily being in open 
conflict with official law. New social practices are intended to hide non-state 
law from the state, or, alternatively to gain the state’s recognition. Self-
regulation as privilege is often conceded and there are many informal guarantees 
that the state will never monitor, take into consideration, or will turn a blind eye 
to whatever is happening behind its back.  
 
 
2. The nature of legal pluralism in state-socialist Hungary 
 
Pre-communist Hungary had few democratic traditions yet it was nonetheless a 
country with considerable official respect for the rule of law. Its legal system 
was under the influence of Germany but it also had considerable peculiarities 
due to its feudal customary law and the institutionalization of a strong 
independent judiciary in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Given the demographic 
predominance of the peasantry within the society it is not surprising that peasant 
folklore survived as a competing normative system, recognized to a small extent 
even by the courts. Further, it was part of peasant mentality to avoid coming 
into contact with the law and evade it to the fullest extent possible without 
challenging it outright. 
 Under the communists the legal system copied Soviet models to a great 
extent. However, the more refined qualities of the pre-socialist legal structure 
did not disappear without a trace, although the legal system was rudimentary 
and allowed for nearly unlimited discretion and delegation of authority. Despite 
all of this, there was still a real need for some consistency and predictability, at 
least in order to run the public bureaucracy, even in a system where important 
decisions were taken at secret communist party meetings. For example, 
beginning with the Sixties the law stated that citizens may receive an exit visa to 
the West once every three years, as long as such visa would not violate the 
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“public interest”. The meaning of the term “public interest” was not specified in 
the law and judicial review of these decisions were not available. Nonetheless, 
the law mandated a 60 day deadline for the application to be processed. The 
conditions of applying and those of a refusal were promulgated in a norm 
accessible to the general public, although the source itself was a relatively low 
level administrative decree, which was easy to amend.7 
 Legal pluralism existed as part of “socialist cohabitation”, a modus vivendi 
of the middle classes that emerged under Communist Party Secretary General 
János Kádár from the late 1960’s. The pragmatic party leadership realized, at 
least to some extent, that the officially declared Soviet values and goals, if 
vigorously enforced in private affairs, will run into considerable social 
resistance, which by that time the regime was more keen on trying to avoid. 
So it offered certain informal compromises leading to the tolerance of private 
entrepreneurship—however limited in scope—among others. As part of the 
same attitude of compromise the Hungarian authorities required only a limited 
active endorsement of the regime, although organizational loyalty remained a 
crucial prerequisite of social advancement within the system.  
 At the same time, and partly irrespective of this soft attitude of the 
Communist Party, the individual and her few remaining personal communities 
(workplace relations, extended family) tried to develop creative forms and 
networks of cooperation that disregarded the official normative order. Although 
the state tried to penetrate private relations and control them—thereby under-
mining the social grass roots of independent normative orders—it was part of 
the communist strategy of domination that parallel normative orders were able to 
develop, in the shadow of the official yet uncertain law.  
 There were two important hurdles to the emergence of these parallel 
normative systems. One, they could not exist in open defiance of the official 
normative system and two, they could not become interrelated at the level of 
social interaction or even at the level of public opinion on a national scale. At 
the shop level in the factories the workers followed their own normative 
expectations with the complicity of the foreman or even the director (as to work 
safety, hourly norm, work intensity, (lack of) productivity, (lack of) efficiency in 
the use of raw materials, distribution of assets, income, changing/altering of 
product line, etc.). However, they always did so by creating sufficient 
paperwork to demonstrate that they observed the official norms and the 





 In 1987 the Act on lawmaking was enacted. According to the Act rights and other 
important matters were to be regulated by acts of parliament which then meant mostly 
an act of the Presidium (law-decree). 
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normative order remain hidden from other similarly situated actors. The regime 
would not tolerate the existence of a shared local experience if that attempted to 
emerge as a public phenomenon of some scale. By keeping the local experience 
hidden the authorities were not forced to confront and acknowledge the de facto 
existence of parallel norms.  
 Generated by economic scarcity a partially correlated structure of sub-legal 
(and to an extent illegal) local normative ordering, a kind of informal protocol 
of transactions, developed within the sphere of daily life. Scarcity of resources 
and their uneven distribution based on demonstration of loyalty led to the 
development of a system of exchange that included the bartering of anything 
ranging from common goods to administrative favoritism, thereby leading to a 
state of affairs bordering on the notion of systemic corruption. People were 
aware that they were committing an act of bribery in order to get a bed in a 
preferred hospital, or have access to certain consumer goods in short supply, 
or perhaps in the process of obtaining some favors (in ways that were not 
necessarily legally prohibited but certainly questionable by the “moral standards” 
of the state) when dealing with an official of the public administration, but all 
the while they maintained a peculiar sense of schizophrenia which allowed 
these illegalities and immoralities to be understood as “normal”.8 So, once again, 
with institutional and even organizational complicity of the authorities, there 
were parallel normative systems, partly in violation of the official law, yet at 
the same time enabling the functioning of the system from the perspective of 
practicality.  
 Compared to the legal system of the Soviet Union the primitive legal system 
of Hungary satisfied the requirements of hierarchy and predictability, a formal 
feature which the Slavic and Central Asian Republics located on the former 
Soviet territory could not master until this very day. On the other hand “socialist 
legality” failed to create a legal system which would have punished those who 
abused power to the detriment of their fellow citizens. The legal system also 
failed in establishing its own credibility with regard to the accountability of 
those holding power (including the use of force by the police). The legal system 
was only one of the many components of a society wide system of inter-
dependency which also included many unwritten rules. Instead of recognizing 
legally enforceable rights, those who were loyal received favors. This contributed 
to the gradual emergence of keeping society dependent of the state, including 
the dependence of parallel non-state normative systems on the clemency 
and mercy of the state legal system. For example, state controlled farmers’ 
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not officially fully permitted, but could continue to prosper as long as some 
influential socialist “boss” provided political protection resulting in non-inter-
ference by police and other authorities. 
 
 
3. The system emerging after the collapse of state socialism: resources of  
 constitutionalism  
 
In all the post-Soviet countries of Europe the formation of the new non-
communist regimes was carried out in the name of Westernization. It was 
especially the case with the creation of a rule-of-law legal and governmental 
system. The negation of the previous regime was understood—at least in the 
first years of the transition—as the adoption or even return to Western law and 
respective legal institutions. This was a legitimate goal even in the case of 
rampantly nationalist regimes because even these had to demarcate themselves 
from the inherently corrupt previous regime. Nothing seemed more credible 
than the adoption of those forms and institutions of government which were 
vehemently opposed and denounced by the communist regimes. Furthermore, 
in some countries there was a genuine popular discontent with the lawless 
oppression of the past regime. While the early legislation and constitution-
making of the Nineties was essentially a rapid wholesale importation of Western 
laws and legal principles, the process was plagued by many misinterpretations, 
deliberate distortions, and a general lack of systematic implementation. The 
process was inevitably slowed down more and more, partly because of costs 
and social irrelevancy, and partly because of the increased ability to formally 
articulate locally emerging initiatives specific to the unique circumstances of a 
particular country. This genuine development was often formulated in the shape 
of nationalist ideology, erroneously referring to national legal traditions which, 
in reality, were actually often Soviet and bureaucratic traditions in origin. Such 
resistance to change helped to preserve the status quo ante. 
 Nevertheless, there were countries like Hungary with markets wide open to 
international investment, as they truly depended on foreign investment and thus 
could not afford economic isolation. As for the political sphere, political groups 
were not dependent on the monopolization of political power. This meant that 
the legal system continued to develop along Western lines (primarily following 
German models and increasingly those of the European Union as well). The 
drive to Westernize the legal system was also fueled by the commonly held 
position pronouncing the importance of entering the camp of the West 
institutionally, by way of joining NATO and the European Union. Western 
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recognition continued to play a major role in legitimating the democratically 
elected or established political power. Perhaps the inferiority complex of the 
new leaders rooted in their lack of sufficient understanding and knowledge of 
the Western world contributed to such needs for legitimacy. These factors might 
also have been supplemented by the actual dependency on foreign investors of 
both the country and the citizens from the very beginning.9 
 In a number of areas the current character of the legal system is reminiscent 
of a somewhat simplified, yet relatively modern Western European system, at 
least as far as the law on the books is concerned. Notwithstanding some deliberate 
distortions, today there are effectively functioning institutions safeguarding the 
implementation of an impressive new body of law. Most of the usual guarantees 
of independence are in place. The civil service sector is subject to law, and 
offers a secure long-term professional carrier opportunity. Closely related to this 
phenomenon is the tendency which has seen the number of lawyers on the bar 
increase tenfold and accordingly the number of law students admitted to 
university is almost one magnitude higher than the numbers registered in 1988. 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court initiated a vigorous campaign to protect and 
even to create fundamental rights. The attempts of the Constitutional Court were 
met by the formal acquiescence of the government. Still, even at this moment 
there are more than a dozen constitutional omissions which have not been 
remedied by the legislative branch, notwithstanding the (sometimes repeated) 
condemnation of the Court. Very slowly—and in a most controversial way—
constitutional values and rules (including the “universalism” of the ECHR) do 
penetrate into the jurisprudence of lower level courts. 
 Nevertheless, there is growing discontent with the functioning of the legal 
system, and anecdotal evidence (amplified by the press and “law and order” 
politicians) indicates that the system is malfunctioning or that it is socially 
irrelevant, partly because of the efficiency limiting consequences of the rule of 
law. It is true that law can no longer be used as a cynical tool of monopolistic 
oppression. Nonetheless, it promotes the domination of the political power 
holders, enabling them to gain and protect personal advantages. The formalities 
of the rule of law helped the elite to steal the state and later to keep the booty. 
People believe that there is rampant corruption and that the laws are written in a 
way that favors the powerful, including those members of the nomenclature who 
managed to transform their social networking capital into power and property. 
Tax evasion is wide spread and systematic, and employment is often unreported 





 In Hungary even the racist party leaders expect legitimacy from being pictured in 
the company of Le Pen. 
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contracts of sale or services are not formalized at all or are finessed. The law 
offers limited protection against police abuse, neither does it provide safety on 
the streets against crime. The overall performance of law enforcement agencies 
is considered to be poor and the authority of the police is much less respected 
than in most Western European countries. At the same time most people do not 
expect to get meaningful protection of their property and contractual rights 
from courts and public administration. Private enforcement of contracts (debt-
collection, including abusive enforcement) is on the rise. Consumers are less 
protected than ever, at least the consumer protection inspectorate thinks so when 
reporting that in retail trade at least half or as much as 60 per cent of products 
sold are defective or substandard (smaller actual weight, no warranty, poor 
quality, etc.). In particular those in a weaker social position expect no protection 
from the courts and the administrative system. Rather, they continue to perceive 
themselves not as rights-holders but as dependent clients of the state.  
 The “rule of law”, one of the fixations of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court and of the emerging political and economic elite, has some perhaps 
unintended consequences. For example, former communists never actually had 
to wake up on a day of reckoning as a result of the insistence on the rule of law 
and personality rights, thus holding responsible former communists and secret 
service agents for their actions in the past has been halted, while personal 
dossiers of these former agents of the regime remained under the exclusive 
management of the government in power until at least 2003. Along the same 
line (i.e. rule of law), questionable privatization contracts with implicit 
advantages to the new owner remain in force, and other privatization and bank 
consolidation deals based on explicit favoritism, corruption, and embezzlement 
remain off limits.  
 
 
4. Parallel normative systems 
 
a) Continued illegal normative systems within the legal system (the “norm-
making” power of scarce resources) 
 
Under state socialism it was one of the preconditions of social cohabitation that 
no sphere—except for, to a limited extent, family relations—could claim relative 
independence or autonomy from the state. It is in this respect that civil society 
was in any way meaningful to the individual. The desire to be part of civil society 
simply indicated a need for spheres immune from aggressively inquisitive 
state oversight. 
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 Today, the extent to which social subsystems and various spheres of social 
activity have gained independence from the state and the viability of their 
respective normative orders still remains to be seen. It is clear that in sectors 
where market conditions have prevailed the former scarcity based normative 
systems have also disappeared. Today, trivial as it may sound, no shopper is 
going to have to bribe a salesperson to buy a pair of blue jeans at the store. By 
the same token, the conduct of the salesperson is determined by the ever 
changing rules of the labor market and the rules set by the store management 
itself. However, contrast is most apparent where the state continues to be the 
provider of services without adequate resources, for example, in health care and 
education. There, scarcity prevails. This means that traditional normative 
structures of normalized illegality remain in place unchanged, including the 
necessity (on both the side of the provider and the recipient of services) of 
rampant corruption in exchange for rightful services or illegal favors. In these 
scenarios, obviously, patterns developed earlier are carried over and continue to 
be useful. Consequently, corruption becomes increasingly normalized with the 
unintended effect that it may become a model of operation even in those areas 
that are not affected by the scarcity of resources.  
 The schizophrenia of legal consciousness remains a constant, while in the 
meantime a highly problematic solution emerges. Cynicism seems to be the 
universal answer and the way out of this conundrum: it is not even perceived as 
immoral to be on the recipient end of and participate in cultures of corruption. 
This tendency may well end up undermining the legitimacy of the new 
constitutional democracies.10 In a way even the rule of law may contribute 
to shortage and scarcity and hence create new opportunities for corruption. 
The recent history of the land register is a telling example. Land records became 
crucial documents in the privatization process. The workload of the admin-
istrative agencies responsible for maintaining and updating the records increased 
dramatically. The state’s monopoly of registration resulted in excessive delays 
which were not acceptable to the participants of the rapid privatization process. 
As a result, lawyers and other actors increasingly performed the role of the 
middleman in greasing the hands of the administrators in order to get expedited 
processing and increasingly even for falsifying the records of the land register. 
Immense administrative delays also lead to the evolution of a new industry 
operating on the currency of small favors and bribery. Volunteer experts would 






 See Sajó, A.: Corruption, Clintelism, and the Future of the Constitutional State in 
Eastern Europe. 7 East European Constitutional Review 2, 1998. 37. 
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b) Forms of internal pluralism 
 
There is still enormous dependency on the state, and not only in the economy 
(70–80 per cent of which is privatized) but in all spheres of private and 
communal life as well. Religious exercise, non-governmental activities, local 
self-governments, pensions and culture all depend on a politicized central 
government. Until recently even broadcasting had been a state monopoly. 
In Hungary such dependency is “constitutionalized” in the sense that both the 
government and the Constitutional Court find the active promotion of con-
stitutional welfare rights the obligation of the state.  
 The towering all-encompassing presence of the state, a fact of life inherited 
from state-socialism is, however, over. It seems to have been replaced by mutual 
dependence between civil society and the state, or more specifically between 
a clientele of service recipients and government bureaucracies. In theory, 
codependence of the public and private institutions is likely to lead to some kind 
of domination of either one or the other. Here an entirely new phenomenon 
emerges: the interdependent private spheres try to take over the state (see “state 
capture”11 ) and determine its law.  
 In this struggle two predominant strategies seem to have emerged so far: 
(a) increasingly ambitious attempts to lobby the legislature that a private 
ordering of a particular segment of life be blessed as general norm (termination 
of pluralism in favor of particularism), and (b) private and non-governmental 
structures pressure the state to allow their own private ordering to prevail and 
exist “undisturbed” or even receive state sanctioning and enforcement (exclusive 
private ordering).12  
 In reality, of course, these are well known developments in neo-corporate 
formations. The surprising development in Hungary is that here relatively weak 
corporate formations are successful. In Hungary about 12 per cent of the 
population is actively practicing religion (many of them follow non-mainstream 
religions), although nominally 70 per cent of the population considers itself of 
“Christian origin”. In the past nine years, despite the lack of popular enthusiasm 





 See for example Hellman, J.–Kaufmann, D.: Confronting the Challenge of State 
Capture in Transition Economies. Finance and Development, September 2001, Vol. 38, 3. 
 
12
 A classic, non-post-communist example is commercial arbitration. Max Weber 
considered it as a reaction of business interests to the formal, anti-business rationality of state 
law. According to Weber arbitration is a necessity even where the private law of the state 
embodied market rationality, because bureaucracy and judges are unable to understand 
market considerations. 
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the traditional churches have been receiving rather generous financial support 
both from the socialist and the conservative governments. The ownership rights 
of buildings formerly belonging to the traditional (“historic”) churches were 
returned even in cases where there were no religious personnel to make use of 
them. Also, there is another tendency in moving public education closer to 
religion in the form of financial support to church operated schools.  
 Similar examples of private ordering sanctioned by the state are numerous. A 
weak and barely legitimate trade union movement got control of social security 
funds13 which were de-etatized and transferred to trade union controlled 
self-governments. All sorts of chambers of commerce have been created by 
legislation with public supervisory and disciplinary duties in areas where the 
professionals’ interests clearly prevail over consumers’ without proper oversight 
(i.e. trade chamber, medical chamber, the bar). Legislation has also been passed 
to create public foundations to perform government tasks (services) with 
(financial) resources transferred from the government, but without continued 
governmental supervision, intervention or personal accountability incorporated 
into the system. The bylaws of such NGOs are not subject to government 
approval since that would go against the ideal of creating a civil society 
independent of the powers that be. Quite often the boards of these public 
foundations are comprised of former civil servants who previously had been in 
charge of the very same functions, but for much lower compensation and under 
stricter conflict of interest rules than what is the norm at these foundations. 
Privatization of the state implies a private ordering that is partly immune to 
the normative expectations of the legal system. In Hungary, the problem is 
fortunately only that of scope, while in Russia, for example, private normative 
orders have been known to undermine central coordination. In Russia not only 
do the various regions and cities tend to follow their own particular legal order,14 
but even larger factories and industrial conglomerates disregard central and 
other legal norms and follow their own normative structures as to workplace 
safety, taxation, salary, contractual relations, etc.  
 One does not even have to believe that contemporary law is fundamentally 
post-modern in nature (i.e. inconclusive, not well defined) to recognize that 









 For example, in some Russian Republics the legislation, by failing to legislate on 
private land ownership, successfully disregarded that the federal constitution expressly 
provides for the right to private property on land. The political leadership in these republics 
continues to manage land and forest as state property. 
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admittedly with relatively settled rules or formulas for resolving possible 
conflicts. It is in this context that the allegedly homogeneous15 constitutional 
system attempts to colonize other spheres of law and it is through these consti-
tutionalized legal branches that it attempts to introduce other institutions and 
interactive structures into a constitutionally devised homogeneous order.16  
 
c) External legal pluralism 
i) non-inclusion 
 
The above mentioned interdependencies of the private normative structures and 
law reveal a typical tension. Other normative structures simply disregard or 
challenge state law, and hence in that case there is not even a chance for the rule 
of law and values of legal modernity to prevail.  
 First of all, so long as there are non-integrated communities in society there 
will be separate and segregated quasi legal systems. State-socialism intended to 
atomize its subjects and tended to include all members of society in its general 
network of supervision. In part these conscious and systematic attempts of 
atomization were due to a fear of autonomy of any sort, including autonomy 
of communities. Hence—at least in Hungary—very few groups managed to 
maintain their own self-supporting norms. The most significant example of this 
norm protection could be observed in the Romani (Gypsy) community, which 
quickly regained some of its earlier (although distorted) customs after the end of 
state dominance. Such increased reliance on a parallel system of norms is partly 
the result of increased segregation that followed the massive lay-offs after the 
collapse of communism, affecting disproportionately the Roma. Clan-based 
normative systems became vital for survival of the segregated Roma with the 
growing marginalization and prejudice that followed the collapse of state 
socialism turning increasing numbers of Roma into social outcasts. Suddenly, 









 These phenomena are known in Germany as third party effect (Drittwirkung). Similar 
trends emerged in New York Times v. Sullivan. 
 
17
 There are probably 400–600,000 Roma in Hungary, although at least a third of them 
fully integrated into the lower working classes, and another perhaps 20–30 per cent not living 
in segregated communities. The isolation is more visible in Romania, where the Gypsies 
were hardly ever settled and where their number at least a couple of millions. Here, obviously 
the parallel legal system is more visible and widespread, among others because there their 
customs were never corrupted to the extent they were in Hungary due to the partial 
social integration. 
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networks because of segregation. The Roma could not rely on state law as a 
system of protection as this was increasingly denied of them. Other similar 
factors of growing alienation from official law include the application of legal 
rules which were harmful to Roma or were applied in a prejudicial way, such as 
relating to the due process guarantees of criminal procedures.18 Needless to say 
the functioning of a so-called culturally based legal pluralism is significantly 
more critical in multiethnic societies where ethnicity is also a designator of 
competing cultures. This was the case of Albanians in Yugoslavia and 
Macedonia, and of many Muslim and nomadic communities in Russia. 
 There are other examples of differentiated life-forms which tend to disregard 
the state without confronting it. There is of course a known sphere outside or 
above the law. The wealthy can afford to pay (or avoid) all the fines imposed by 
a weak state and conduct a life of their own disregarding the law. The wealthy 
are ready to pay the parking and speeding tickets, if unavoidable, and pay the 
penalties for building villas without a building permit where zoning regulations 
may be in place in order to protect an environmentally sensitive area. Or better, 
they use their enormous resources (financial and social) to delay enforcement, or 
bribe officials if it is cheaper than paying penalties. If pressured, they usually 
find an even weaker state to repatriate to. 
 
ii) legal orders attempting to take over the state legal order 
(the“criminalization of the state”) 
 
The most important normative order competing with, challenging, and in certain 
countries endangering official law is the law of criminal (illegal) organizations. 
Sometimes these are systems of rules generated within large organizations 
which were created by or with complicity of the government, such as oil and 
gas companies. Extraction, refining, and export-import are usually licensed 
monopolies. These activities—often being of a criminal nature themselves—
generate further criminality as the profits move into other explicitly illegal forms 
of investments (drug and arms). The people involved in these large sectors are 
operating by a set of relatively simple rules which apply to their entire conduct. 
People who get involved in this world usually do so without the possibility of 





 It is not the subject of the present paper to decide whether the Roma-official law 
conflicts are increasing because of the growing Roma-“White” conflict, or the conflict is 
growing because of the cultural differences among the two normative systems. This is a 
multi-cultural conflict which could not manifest itself under socialism as socialism oppressed 
all diversity, and also destroyed Roma culture through superficial integration. 
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 A second major area where the government’s legal involvement is critical 
in many regards is banking. In this sector, at least in Hungary, the direct in-
volvement of organized crime with the ownership structure (although the oil 
industry does need banks for money transfers, that is, laundering purposes) is 
believed to be marginal. The law used to allow privileges, such as lack of 
stringent regulation of the writing off of bad debt, legalized forms of self-
dealing, etc. In exchange the management of banks which were dependent on 
state bail outs were ready to finance government initiatives. No-interest loans 
were offered to government people. In this example the borderline between 
state law and bank generated (but officially sanctioned) practices that have 
the power to transform the entire national economic landscape becomes 
impossible to locate. The self-regulation of the banking sector partly operates 
as a private regulatory system that is sanctioned by government. Banking laws, 
like in more advanced market economies, are written to a great extent by 
the banking community. Further, the official regulation creates and enables a 
private system which has more practical influence on everyday life than direct 
governmental regulation itself. Banking law, or rather the law of the banks, is 
the result of hidden yet formally completely legalized interaction with state 
law, or at least with official figures in charge. 
 In both cases (oil and banks) official law helps to legitimize immoral and by 
ordinary standards very often illegal corporate behavior which then has the 
enormous power to shape the fundamental social and economic structures within 
emerging market economies. It is within this interaction, above all, where the 
formal structures of modern law fail to exert the much needed positive impact 
they are designed to bring to society. Ultimately, state law may in fact fail to 
properly shape elementary forms of social interaction based on equality, trust 
and reliance, and perhaps even a sense of justice. 
 
 
 
